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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL W. BARNEY, ] 
Petitioner, 
v . } 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ) 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, DEPARTMENT ] 
OF COMMERCE, STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Respondent. 
i Case No. 920213 
Petitioner files this reply pursuant to Rule 47(e), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, as follows: 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over the final 
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies. Title 78-2a-3(2)(a), 1953 Utah Code Ann., as 
amended. 
The order of the agency denying a motion to dismiss the Notice 
of Agency Action of the ground that it constituted a second 
prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause Amendment Five, 
Constitution of the United States, was a final order of the State 
agency. Abney v. United States. 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 
LEd2d 651 (1977). 
This is so because it rests upon an explicit constitutional 
guarantee that a second trial will not occur. It involves an 
important right which would be lost irreparably if review had to 
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await an order after a second trial. Immediate appealability turns 
on the contour of the right asserted, and not on the likelihood of 
eventual success. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495; 
109 S.Ct. 1976; 104 LEd2d 548 (1989). 
Petitioner seeks review of the Utah Court of Appeals ruling 
that it does not have jurisdiction to hear petitioner's Petition of 
Review of a final order of a state agency if there is further 
action contemplated by the agency. He does not seek review of the 
agency order before this court. 
The petitioner had made every effort to exhaust all 
administrative remedies before petitioning the Court of Appeals for 
review. Review by the Department of Commerce turned a purblind eye 
to the glass and claim of the petitioner not to be tried a second 
time, and refused to see the signal - nor was the departmental 
review necessary for the Court of Appeals to recognize its 
jurisdiction. Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P2d 459, 
(Ut.App. 1991). 
This court has jurisdiction to review the erroneous decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THERE ARE NO VIOLATIONS OF RULES 3 3 AND 40, 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
At no point has the agency or any court made a finding that 
any appeal has been frivolous or brought for the purpose of 
delay,nor has this petition been brought for any purpose of delay 
because the Utah Court of Appeals has refused to stay the 
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remittitur of the case. However, it is not in the power of the 
Court of Appeals to foreclose the petitioner for petitioning this 
court for appropriate relief. 
To be frivolous, the facts alleged must be clearly baseless, 
fanciful, fantastic, even delusional, rising to the level of the 
irrational or the wholly incredible. The petitioner has alleged 
that the DIVISION OF OCCUPATION AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING acts in 
a manner and with a purpose to mete out punishment to those deemed 
worthy of punishment. The record on appeal shows this bias of the 
division. To dismiss review as frivolous without regard to the 
facts, is to disregard the teachings of experience; truth may be 
stranger than fiction. Denton v. Hernandez, No. 90-1846, U.S. 
Supreme Court, decided May 4, 1992; See: 60 Law Week, at page 4348. 
There is no basis to sanction the petitioner or his attorney 
in this case. 
Point II 
IT IS CLEAR THE QUESTION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
IS NOT A QUESTION OF PROOF BUT OF PUNISHMENT. 
The introduction of relevant evidence of a particular 
misconduct in a case is not the same thing as prosecution for that 
conduct. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. ; 112 S.Ct. ; 118 
LEd2d 25, (1992). 
In the case at hand, the administrator seeks to impose 
sanctions against the petitioner on the basis of acts of the 
petitioner for which he was tried and acquitted in a court of law. 
Those acts alone would be sufficient to make a finding of guilt of 
unprofessional conduct and to sustain any sanctions imposed. Thus, 
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it is not a matter of standard of proof, but a matter of being tied 
twice for the same offense or act. 
Double jeopardy does apply in the case herein, but that 
question is for the Court of Appeals in the proper exercise of its 
jurisdiction. 
Point III 
THERE IS A DEPARTURE FROM 
SETTLED LAW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
State v. Ambrose, 598 P2d 354 (Ut-1979) , and McNair v. 
Havward, 666 P2d 321 (Ut-1983), both hold that the normal rule of 
finality, under which the losing party must wait until after a 
trial to challenge intermediate rulings would force the person to 
suffer the prejudice the double jeopardy clause seeks to prevent 
before he would have an appellate forum to hear his claim. 
Reliance on Sloan v. Board of Review. 781 P2d 463, (Ut.App.-
1989) , undermines the declared object of the law settled by the 
Supreme Court, and weighs the supposed public interest against a 
fundamental constitutional right and interest of the petitioner 
completely unknown to settled principles of law. 
Conclusion 
Petitioner urges that the court direct a writ of certiorari to 
the Utah Court of Appeals on the issue of the finality of an order 
denying dismissal of an agency action brought into issue upon a 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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motion to dismiss for violation of the double jeopardy provisions 
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Petitioner also asks that there be no sanctions for an alleged 
frivolous appeal. 
, ft 
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